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Abstract
Citizen assessment of government performance is a cornerstone of the successful func-
tioning of democracy. However, accountability is a double-edged sword. When voters
misunderstand the stakes and provide the wrong incentives to elected officials, political ac-
countability leads to an implementation of suboptimal welfare policies. This paper reveals
that an electorate can demand clientelism. I find evidence that after a drought, voters
increase the vote share of local incumbent parties that are politically aligned with the
central government to ensure the inflow of partisan government aid relief. Such behavior
reinforces the central government’s incentives to bias policies in favor of politically aligned
municipalities to influence elections. Consequently, the circle of distortion of aid relief al-
location is perpetuated. The data cover the Brazilian democratic elections from 1998 to
2012. I use fixed effects models with panel data and a regression discontinuity design with
heterogeneous treatment effects. The results resemble a long-run patronage equilibrium.
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“The new question is not whether voters are responding to government
performance but whether they are responding in the right manner.”
– Healy and Malhotra (2013)
1 Introduction
Democratic systems based on free elections are commonly accepted as one of the most efficient
means to form welfare-enhancing governments. A wide range of models (Ferejohn, 1986; Pers-
son et al., 1997) suggest that public officers implement optimal policies when they are selected
and sanctioned through universal suffrage. In this process, voters retrospectively evaluate the
performances of incumbents and punish or reward them in subsequent elections. If one assumes
that voters’ preferences are tied to honesty, competence, and effort and that voters hold politi-
cians accountable for those attributes, politicians have the incentive to behave accordingly.
Democracy can produce inefficient policies, however, if voters’ choices provide misleading in-
centives for elected officials. In this case, accountability plays a detrimental role and weakens
the motives to implement optimal welfare policies. For instance, in a context where a narrow
elite controls economic institutions and persists in power through patronage by distorting the
allocation of public resources, retrospective voting could slide society into a slow-developing
course (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). Understanding the circle that connects retrospective
voting behavior with policy outcomes is a major line of research (Healy and Malhotra, 2013).
This study addresses this research topic by showing that voters could demand clientelism.1
I find empirical evidence that an electorate rewards partisan alignment between different tiers
of the government in order to ensure the inflow of public funds. A partisan alignment between
the central government and local politicians is a strong determinant of intergovernmental trans-
fers. Voters may decide to settle this connection to take advantage of the short-run benefits of
patronage politics. However, this relationship comes at the cost of encouraging the government
to bias the distribution of public resources toward party labels. Such behavior could be trans-
lated as a failure of government efficiency and might lead to a long-run sub-optimal equilibrium
(Healy and Malhotra, 2009). In a desirable situation, voters in such environments should con-
demn individualistic transactions that are more costly than socially beneficial (Hicken and
Simmons, 2008; Shin, 2015). However, if voters demand it, elections could fall into a vicious
circle of clientelism in which voters from different localities do not cooperate and in which
everyone ends up worse off, similar to a Bertrand trap (Cabral and Villas-Boas, 2005).
The paper demonstrates such a relation by empirically studying voters’ reaction to droughts,
the government’s accountability when assigning drought mitigation policies, and voters’ re-
sponses to this (perverse) accountability in a vote-buying context known in Brazil as the
drought industry.2 Investigating voters’ choices that undermine social welfare is suitable in
contexts where there are frequent natural catastrophes because these events could lead to a
1Defined as large-scale exchanges of targeted goods and favors between patrons and client with a hierarchy
of intermediaries (Fukuyama, 2014).
2The drought industry, or indu´stria da seca, is an expression used to refer to the clientelism relationship
between the elite (corone´is) and the peasants (flagelados) who exploit the humanitarian collapse driven by
droughts in Brazil to obtain electoral influence in exchange for votes for water distribution. This term was first
mentioned by Callado (1960). More details in Appendix A.
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situation where voters must make a difficult decision. More specifically, considering a scenario
in which political alignment between tiers of government is already in place, voters face the
following dilemma after a shock of drought. Although getting rid of incumbent politicians in
elections should discipline governments into good performance, thereby blaming the incumbent
for a lack of policies that have resulted in permanent solutions, voting for these incumbents may
guarantee partisanship in the provision of palliative policies from other governmental levels. If
citizens in vulnerable conditions who have their standards of living diminished by natural dis-
asters still show increased support for politicians in power because of political alliances, then
this finding would indicate a decision in favor of patronage politics rather than disciplining
welfare-enhancing governments. This dynamic is exactly what the paper shows; droughts drive
voters to plead for even more political alignment.
The dilemma faced by voters is based on three premises: 1) whether voters punish in-
cumbents because of natural disasters, 2) whether voters reward governments because of aid
relief, and 3) whether governments bias the allocation of aid relief. More precisely, the first
hypothesis is that droughts alter political preferences as voters blame politicians for worsening
living conditions (Gasper and Reeves, 2011; Bruckner and Ciccone, 2011). This willingness to
blame the political class may arise either because governments have not implemented adapta-
tion policies to mitigate the effects of droughts or because governments are responsible for some
of the vulnerable social conditions exacerbated by this kind of natural disaster (Quiroz Flores
and Smith, 2013; Heersink et al., 2017). I analyze two types of Brazilian elections at the mu-
nicipality level: presidential (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010) and mayoral (2000, 2004, 2008, 2012).
Implementing a fixed effects panel data analysis, I find that voters indeed punish the incum-
bent party for droughts in elections. On average, the president’s party vote decreases by five
percentage points, and the mayor’s party vote decreases by seven percentage points.
The second hypothesis is that central governments are electorally rewarded for distributing
mitigation policies that aim to alleviate the misery triggered by water scarcity. An increase in
the public supply of water and food and infrastructure investment in the affected areas may
reduce economic losses and relieve the pain of the population. Consequently, voter’s angriness
against the political class could be attenuated or even converted into popularity (Healy and
Malhotra, 2010; Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011). In the same line, the paper shows that the
adverse impact of drought is, on average, completely compensated by the provision of palliative
and prevention policies in presidential elections but not in mayoral elections. The results also
indicate that voters are keenly aware that it is the central government that grants the droughts
aid relief and that voters react more positively to palliative rather than preventive policies.
The third hypothesis is that governments tend to allocate intergovernmental transfers
strategically. If the central government has strong opportunistic electoral objectives, the gov-
ernment may distort the provision of aid relief in order to maximize its chances of re-election
(Arulampalam et al., 2009). Indeed, the nature of disaster relief as an emergency expenditure
creates room for discretionary allocations, and disaster relief is frequently associated with mis-
use of public spending (Garrett and Sobel, 2003; Cole et al., 2012). The capture of drought
mitigation policies by the government as a tool to influence electoral outcomes is at the heart
of inefficient resource allocation. Applying a more flexible version of the regression disconti-
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nuity design (RDD) with heterogeneous effects proposed by Becker et al. (2013), I show that
before presidential elections, any aligned municipality is more likely to receive palliative policy
than the non-aligned ones. The effect is enormous and reaches almost 74 percentage points
for droughts categorized as extremes. I do not find similar opportunistic behavior with the
provision of preventive policies or when the target elections are for mayors.
The dynamics between the negative shock of droughts on elections and the political use
of mitigation policy converges to a predicament for the electorate, which in turn allows for
the assessment of voters’ choices. In one regard, disciplining government performance implies
punishing politicians in power after a serious drought. However, in the circumstance where
there is already party symmetry between local politicians and central government, punishing
incumbents would extinguish the political alignment. In this case, changing the incumbent
party for the opposition parties would result in fewer chances for intergovernmental transfers
coming from the central government. If voters acknowledge the political alignment advantage
to the extent that they reward it or are even aware that it is a bias, incumbents have no
incentive to change the way they operate, which will perpetuate the problem. As a result,
disaster relief could become an institutionalized form of clientelism between governments and
citizens, which in turn prevents the implementation of more sustainable adaptation policies
against droughts, as denounced in Nelson and Finan (2009).
The main analysis adopts as empirical strategies both the fixed effects panel data model
and also the RDD with heterogeneous treatment effects in order to ensure both causal inter-
pretations and external validation. The study reveals that voters reward party alignment in
mayoral elections but that there is no evidence of strategic voting during presidential elections.
The reward for the partisan alliance rises after the shock of a drought. I find that droughts
increase the effect of political alignment by approximately 8 percentage points in the vote share
of the mayor’s party. In presidential elections, however, voters do not seek alignment, and after
a severe drought, the vote share of the president’s party decreases by 12 percentage points in
aligned municipalities. This behavior may be explained by the fact that voters care about
their mayor being aligned with the president before presidential elections (when this may be
beneficial by enhancing the chances of obtaining a palliative policy), but voters do not seem to
care about the president being aligned with the mayor in the period before mayoral elections
(when the central government seems to act less opportunistically).
The paper contributes by showing that voters can provide the wrong incentives. The
findings complement the existing literature on patronage politics (Shin, 2015; Anderson et al.,
2015). In particular, in a randomized control trial, Bobonis et al. (2017) show that citizens
granted a residential water cistern in drought-prone areas of Northeast Brazil are less likely
to ask politicians for private benefits. This paper supports their most important conclusion
but differs in at least two important aspects. First, while the above experiment is based on
an intervention from an international development agency, which means a third party that is
independent from the government-voter relationship, my analysis takes into account policies
financed by Brazilian governments. This difference is crucial because politicians claim credit,
which is a relevant intrinsic feature of the political economy of the drought industry. Otherwise,
there would be no incentive for discretionary resource allocation, and government inefficiency
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would not exist. Distinct from Bobonis et al. (2017) who, unsurprisingly, do not find that the
delivery of cisterns directly benefits politicians and conclude that political alignment plays no
role, my findings show that voters reward central governments for the provision of drought
policy and that the political alignment advantage is considerable in mayoral elections. In this
sense, the findings of this paper are closer to those of Martinez-Bravo (2014), who shows that
villages in Indonesia with a village head who is prone to clientelism experience a stronger
electoral alignment with the district-level government. Second, this paper provides a notion of
long-run patronage equilibrium. Instead of analyzing a single electoral period for mayor, my
data extend over a period that captures four national elections and four municipal elections.
The paper is related and contributes to several branches of the literature. First, I use an
innovative measure of drought, the aridity index, which performs better than the measures
used in previous studies in Brazil (Rocha and Soares, 2015; Larreguy and Monteiro, 2014).
This measure is already commonly used in the hydrology literature (Wolfe, 1997; Arora, 2002).
Second, this work contributes to the voter responsiveness literature by adding evidence that
voters punish incumbents because of natural disasters (Barnhart, 1925; Achen and Bartels,
2004; Gasper and Reeves, 2011; Cole et al., 2012; Fair et al., 2015) and reward them because
of aid relief (Healy and Malhotra, 2010; Fuchs and Rodriguez-Chamussy, 2014). However, this
paper opposes the previous work showing that the effect of aid relief is not strong enough for a
net increase in popularity (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011; Gasper and Reeves, 2011; Lazarev
et al., 2014). Third, this paper extends the literature that studies the strategic allocation of
resources by central governments that intend to maximize their electoral support (Downton
and Pielke Jr, 2001; Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008; Cohen and Werker, 2008; Brollo
and Nannicini, 2012; Larreguy and Monteiro, 2014). Furthermore, this work provides evidence
that the type of election matters for discretionary bias. Lastly, the paper contributes to the
emerging literature that explores how retrospective voting influences policy outcomes (Healy
and Malhotra, 2013).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a conceptual framework.
Section 3 presents the data. Sections 4, 5, and 6 show the results of the empirical analysis.
Section 7 concludes. Appendix A gives an overview of the institutional setting and explains
the roots of the political anecdote drought industry and its transition to the current situation.
Appendix B shows the robustness checks of the main analysis. Appendix C shows the RDD
validation graphs. Appendix D provides the data sources.
2 Framework
Consider a setting in which there are three agents: voters, the mayor, and the president.
Voters are subject to two types of time-separated elections: mayoral contests and presidential
contests. In every election year, voters observe the past and make a judgment related to
government performance (retrospective voting) (Nordhaus, 1975), build expectations on what
could maximize future benefits (forward-looking voting) (Drazen and Eslava, 2010), and then
decide to vote against or in favor of the incumbent party. Retrospective voting depends on two
observed events: drought and mitigation policies against droughts. Politicians, in turn, study
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voter decisions and adjust their objective function (Persson and Tabellini, 2002).
Voters blame incumbents for droughts
An extended period of water scarcity in a region affects local communities through economic
and health mechanisms (Girma Kebbede, 1988; Felbermayr and Gro¨schl, 2014; Rocha and
Soares, 2015). In these communities, voters, who see themselves in a worsened condition, are
more likely to infer a low effort from incumbents and blame them for the increase in population
vulnerability.
One can argue that drought is an event that is beyond the influence of politicians and
that it is illogical to expect a voter to punish incumbents for reasons other than government
performance. However, the willingness to blame incumbents for natural disasters is valid under
both of the following assumptions of voter information about drought as an exogenous event
from political decisions: fully aware and insufficiently aware. In the case in which voters are
fully aware that politicians in power do not influence the incidence of droughts, voters may still
blame incumbents for the lack of preparation for negative shocks. In the case in which voters
are insufficiently aware, voters may vote against the politician in office in subsequent elections
as the result of linking their lower standard of living to the performance of the incumbent.
The economic literature suggests that there are at least two reasons, not mutually exclusive,
why voters may not disentangle economic outcomes originating from exogenous shocks, such as
droughts, from those resulting from political decisions. The first reason entails a context with
asymmetric information, where voters observe the economic condition and mistakenly infer
politicians’ quality and effort. The second reason is attribution errors, where voters might be
wrong about the causes of economic conditions (Nordhaus, 1975; Wolfers, 2011; Bagues and
Esteve-Volart, 2016). Along the same line of reasoning, one arrives at the following hypothesis
to be tested:
• Hypothesis 1: droughts have a negative impact on incumbents in elections.
The economic literature on natural disasters has previously addressed this issue. For in-
stance, by analyzing extreme weather events in India to examine the hypothesis that voters
respond to events that are beyond a government’s control, Cole et al. (2012) show that on av-
erage, incumbent parties that run for re-election lose approximately three percent of the vote
per one-standard deviation change in district-level rainfall from the optimum level. Similar
evidence of adverse effects on incumbent re-elections due to droughts can be found for the U.S.
(Barnhart, 1925; Achen and Bartels, 2004) and for Sub-Saharan African countries (Bruckner
and Ciccone, 2011). Evidence for such adverse effects can also be found for other types of natu-
ral disasters, such as floods (Arceneaux and Stein, 2006; Fair et al., 2015), tornadoes (Healy and
Malhotra, 2010), hurricane (Abney and Hill, 1966), and others (Ahlerup, 2013; Quiroz Flores
and Smith, 2013; Lazarev et al., 2014).
6
Voters reward incumbents for aid relief
In contrast to droughts, the aid relief from governments may ease public dissatisfaction.
Households that experience thirst and hunger have their living conditions ameliorated when ex-
ternal agents send supplies of water and food. Consequentially, voters might reward politicians
in power (or just not punish them) because of the responsiveness of politicians after natural
catastrophes. Even if the mitigation policy does not come directly from a policy sphere that is
controlled by the politician in office, voters may infer that good politicians are better able to
capture extra resources from distinct government tiers to reduce drought consequences. Thus,
aid relief from a specific level of government may indirectly affect elected officials at other levels
of government. In the same logical line, the next hypothesis to be tested is as follows:
• Hypothesis 2: mitigation policies have a positive impact on incumbents in elections.
Earlier works have addressed the reward that voters grant politicians in elections for re-
sponsiveness to natural disasters. For instance, Healy and Malhotra (2010) study the effect of
tornadoes on U.S. elections when disaster declarations are made and show that the incumbent
party’s presidential vote share receives an almost four-percentage point increase. Notably, this
study suggests that the benefit of such declarations mostly outweighs the electoral cost of severe
weather. Other studies that show that aid relief converts a negative shock of natural disasters
into popularity can be found for droughts (Gasper and Reeves, 2011; Fuchs and Rodriguez-
Chamussy, 2014), floods (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011), and fires under a non-democratic
regime (Lazarev et al., 2014). I do not find studies showing that governments fail to convert
the negative shock of a natural disaster into a net increase in popularity with disaster response.
Aid relief bias
In the Brazilian context, mayors have limited available resources, and most of the local
public revenues come from transfers from higher levels of government. The president controls
the greatest share of public resources and has more decision-making power to allocate them.3
When there is a drought shock, mayors alone are incapable of properly responding to citizen
demands. Mayors are constrained by the small level of fiscal capacity to deal with unexpected
events. Thus, mayors have to beg the central government for help. In turn, the central gov-
ernment takes into account two elements when deciding where to send resources for mitigation
policies. The first is the severity of the drought. High levels of water scarcity lead to a high
probability of federal intervention. The second is political alignments, meaning the mayors in
the same party as the president have higher chances of receiving aid interventions than mayors
in the opposition party.
There could be two types of political bias experienced by the central government in sending
aid relief, namely, opportunistic and partisan bias (Arulampalam et al., 2009). Assuming
that mitigation policies affect voters’ perceptions of politician quality, this distortion could
3The most important source of municipal revenues is represented by federal transfers, which account for 65%
of the municipal budget on average (Brollo and Nannicini, 2012).
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be used as an instrument to influence electoral outcomes. An upcoming presidential election
could increase the incentives for the central government to prioritize the allocation of public
resources when there is a political alliance with local politicians in office. In this case, voters
might easily assimilate central government action and reward the president’s party directly in
the voting booth. There will be a political bias, then, if the central government has a sufficiently
opportunistic electoral motivation. For instance, when studying the U.S. presidential discretion
in disaster declarations involving floods, Downton and Pielke Jr (2001) find that presidents tend
to issue disaster declarations more generously in years when they are facing re-election.
If the central government has a partisan performance motivation, then one should observe
similar behavior before local elections. Furthering the allocation of mitigation policies to aligned
municipalities just before the mayoral elections would boost the re-election performance of local
politicians. On the one hand, the mitigation policies could help maintain the political alliance
with municipalities; however, the central government has low autonomy in the extraction of rent
from municipal governments. In this sense, for instance, if the central government is relatively
more opportunistic than partisan, one would expect a greater impetus from the party of the
president to favor aligned municipalities just before the presidential elections (Arulampalam
et al., 2009). Hence, under municipal election circumstances, the central government might
exhibit comparatively less biased behavior.
Government efficiency is guaranteed if the central government is fully benevolent. In this
desirable situation, elected officials pursue neither opportunistic nor partisan electoral objec-
tives. Thus, aid delivery policies are orthogonal to party labels, and no bias occurs. Otherwise,
the discretionary of allocation of public funds for the purpose of influencing incumbent electoral
performance rather than enhancing general public welfare would be a failure in the optimal
public provision (Healy and Malhotra, 2009). These discussions call for testing the following
hypothesis:
• Hypothesis 3: the central government biases the allocation of mitigation policies in favor
of aligned municipalities.
The determinants of intergovernmental transfers have been exhaustively studied, and there
is a convincing set of results indicating that party alignment plays a significant role in the
allocation of public resources in various institutional contexts. Such evidence can be found
for the U.S (Downton and Pielke Jr, 2001; Garrett and Sobel, 2003), Spain (Sole´-Olle´ and
Sorribas-Navarro, 2008), India (Arulampalam et al., 2009), and Brazil (Brollo and Nannicini,
2012). In the closest work that addresses droughts and declarations of states of emergency
in Brazil, Larreguy and Monteiro (2014) find that non-aligned municipalities are 5 percentage
points less likely to receive drought relief from the central government. The characteristics
of the mitigation policy might also impact the government’s incentive to bias its allocation.
For instance, the temporal effect of the policy as palliative or preventive, the degree of voter
awareness of each policy, and the bureaucratic rigidity of policy implementation might enhance
or decrease government strategic behavior (Cohen and Werker, 2008).
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Political alignment advantage
Prolonged droughts can also affect strategic voting. Citizens affected by water shortages
could adjust their expectations regarding the persistence and recurrence of these events.4 An in-
crease in vulnerability increases the marginal utility of consumption such that poverty-stricken
citizens may also shift preferences toward private target goods and away from the provision of
public goods (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2013; Bobonis et al., 2017). In aggregate force, the
voters may demand more targeted mitigation policies for droughts. Considering that house-
holds acknowledge that mitigation policies are also a function of political alignment (Larreguy
and Monteiro, 2014), as in a long-run patronage system equilibrium (Nelson and Finan, 2009),
the electorate might ascribe even more weight to the alignment between the incumbent parties
at the national and municipal levels when deciding how to vote. Thus, voters could be induced
to vote for an incumbent who is politically aligned to increase their chance of receiving future
government assistance.
The impact of drought-based voter incentives on the inference of the quality of incumbents
and the shift in preferences toward mitigation policies is unclear. Although sanctioning politi-
cians in power after a drought could discipline the government’s accountability by signaling
for more sustainable adaptation policies, the ouster of a politically aligned incumbent after a
serious drought will extinguish political alignment. The final behavior of the voters will deter-
mine what they find to be most relevant, and in this way, will influence the actions of policy
makers. If voters are perishing from a drought and deliberately support the incumbent because
of a political alliance, this behavior would be characterized as a demonstration of support for
patronage among the levels of government. This is the last hypothesis to test.
• Hypothesis 4: droughts have a positive impact on the re-election of incumbents if they
are politically aligned with other levels of government.
The exact answer to the above hypothesis suggests that the effect of droughts on the vote
share of an incumbent who is politically aligned would be distinct for each type of election
depending on whether the central government is essentially opportunistic, partisan, or benev-
olent. For instance, if the central government is opportunistic, political alignment is more
relevant for the allocation of mitigation policies when presidential elections are approaching.
Then, one would expect that considering a municipal election, voters ascribe more weight to
party alignment in their voting decision. This behavior would be the case since in the years
following mayoral elections, the central government is more prone to send government aid to
the aligned municipalities to increase their electoral performance in the forthcoming presiden-
tial election. In any case, if voters value the chance of receiving targeted mitigation policies to
the extent that the party alignment effect is positive, then the impact of a drought will further
exacerbate this advantage if voters demand clientelism.
As voters in elections hold politicians accountable by selecting and sanctioning politicians
according to voter preferences, politicians are induced to behave accordingly. If voters signal
4Lichand and Mani (2016), when studying 47 municipalities in Ceara´, Northeast Brazil, show that uncertainty
about future rainfall affects farmers’ decision-making through cognitive load leading to a variety of behavioral
biases.
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that they want aid relief with partisan bias, politicians strive to deliver it. This behavior
connects the dots of a clientelism circle. The final outcome is to some extent similar to a
Bertrand supertrap (Cabral and Villas-Boas, 2005). If all municipalities were to cooperate, the
welfare-maximizing strategy would be to cease the patronage politics that cause an inefficient
redistribution of resources and to demand unbiased policies with an emphasis on long-term
prevention. However, rejecting patronage politics implies bearing an immediate cost to citizens
that materializes in the form of less aid for droughts. This dynamic could mean that the
rational response of individual municipalities may to favor rather than oppose patronage.5
The voter rationality assumption is what connects all the hypotheses above and is the most
significant shortcoming in the democratic accountability dynamic. The behavioral response
that allows assessing voter preferences requires that they have a sufficient cognitive capacity
to evaluate government performance and form an expectation of future actions. Thus, if this
assumption does not hold, the theory that justifies the central hypothesis of the paper might
generate different predictions.
3 Data
The empirical analysis exploits Brazilian data on mayoral elections, presidential elections, mu-
nicipality characteristics, the incidence of droughts, and mitigation policies against droughts.
In the following subsections, I show the sources and explain how I constructed the variables
used.
3.1 Elections
The 1988 Brazilian constitution enabled free and universal elections after more than 20 years
of military dictatorship. The contemporaneously constituted democracy follows elections with
a majority rule in which voters elect the candidate with the most votes for each of the three
levels of government executive power: the central government (president), state government
(governor) and municipal government (mayor). Elected officials have a four-year term in of-
fice. However, election years are different for mayors and the governor/president. The central
government and state governments are decided together in elections in the same year, but
municipal governments have a specific election, and the timing difference between these two
elections is always two years, as described in Figure 1. I extracted data on mayoral elections
(years 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012) and presidential elections (years 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010)
from Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.
Two key variables are used in this analysis. The first variable is the vote share of the
incumbent party running for re-election. I construct this variable for the mayor’s party and
the president’s party at the municipality level for both cases. These variables are implemented
as dependent variables throughout the investigation.6
5Redding (1996) and a series of academic works had studied individual behavior as interdependent on what
individuals expect other agents to do. The optimal individual behavior in the presence of this interdependence
between agents drives multiple outcomes. Although these outcomes can differ in their implications for social
welfare, each is a rational equilibrium.
6It is worth mentioning that for the executive branch in Brazil, re-election has been permitted only since 1997
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The second variable is the previous margin of victory for the mayor’s candidate who is
affiliated with the same party as the Brazilian president if the candidate is one of the two
candidates who receive the most votes. For this variable, I also need to extract information
related to the 1996 mayoral elections. The previous margin of victory is used as a running
variable for regression discontinuity design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Margins of victories
above zero determine whether politically aligned candidates with the incumbent president
were elected. The previous margin of victory, which is used as a forcing variable, changes
with the type of election analyzed. For municipal elections, I use the margin of victory in the
last municipal election, which is exactly four years before. For federal elections, the margin of
victory used is from the municipal election two years earlier. The difference stems from the
fact that for the outcomes of both the 2002 federal elections and the 2004 municipal elections,
the previous margins of victory for candidates in the same party as the incumbent president
are drawn from the 2000 mayoral elections. However, the incumbent presidential party in the
federal election in 2002 was PSDB, and the incumbent party in the mayoral election in 2004
was PT.
During the period for which I test the presence of the drought industry, two parties with
different political preferences ruled the Brazilian central government. Fernando Henrique Car-
doso from PSDB, a right-wing party, won the election in 1994. He was re-elected in 1998 and
stayed in office until December of 2002. The presidential election of 2002 was won by Luiz
Ina´cio Lula da Silva from PT, a left-wing party. Lula started his term in January of 2003, was
re-elected in 2006, and stayed in office until December of 2010. Dilma Rousseff, who is also
affiliated with PT, replaced Lula in January of 2011 after winning the presidential election in
October of 2010.
3.2 Droughts
Droughts in the Brazilian territory are extreme cases of water shortages that provoke negative
consequences that go beyond of merely harvest losses. The effects of drought have historically
been associated with the disappearance of lakes, streams, and vegetation, leading to the death
of cattle, goats, and other livestock, which in turn increases malnutrition and thirst and often
leads to humanitarian crisis (Guilhoto et al., 2011). Thus, these extreme events are better
(Emenda Constitucional n. 16, 4th of June) but is still limited to two terms. This restriction means that once
a politician with executive power is re-elected, he becomes a lame duck and cannot be eligible for re-election
again. Thus, the vote share of the incumbent politician seeking re-election is truncated, and using this value
in the analysis means losing observations. Using the vote share of the incumbent party appears to be a better
option since these parties can seek re-election as many times as they try.
11
explained as a matter of water balance than simply the level of rainfall. The economic literature
that addresses droughts across large areas in Brazil using only episodes with a lack of rainfall
is vulnerable to misidentifying extreme water scarcity in locations that have an abundance of
groundwater as they ignore geographical, vegetation, and soil characteristics. As a matter of
fact, it is very unlikely that a period of little rain in the Amazon rainforest would trigger similar
consequences as a similar period in areas that are susceptible to desertification (PAN-BRASIL,
2004). Thus, using variations in rainfall could incorrectly suggest that there is water scarcity
in highly humid areas.
In order to overcome the above caveat, I propose an improved measure of the severity of
droughts in relation to those used in Larreguy and Monteiro (2014), Rocha and Soares (2015),
and Bobonis et al. (2017).7 Instead of only using levels of rainfall, I propose using the ratio
between evaporation and rainfall. This procedure of measurement is similar to those used in
studies focused specifically on hydrology (Wolfe, 1997; Arora, 2002). I define the aridity index







The term AI represents the aridity index. The subscript t represents the month of the
observation for each variable, and the subscript m represents the municipality. Throughout
the paper, I will use a time window of two years, i.e., t = 24.8 This index gives an idea of how
much water is stored in a municipality during the time window adopted. Higher values of this
index indicate that the environment is arid.
I extract monthly precipitation and evaporation data from ground weather stations from
INMET, the Brazilian Institute of Meteorology.9 Figure 2a depicts the location of the 180
ground stations. The monthly level of precipitation and evaporation for every Brazilian mu-
nicipality is extrapolated as follows. I first locate the closest ground meteorological station in
each quadrant to the north-east, north-west, south-east, and south-west of every municipal-
ity. Then, I compute the distance between the municipality’s centroid and the ground station.
The inverse square of this distance is used as a weight to proxy weather variables for each
municipality.
Since elections regularly occur in October, I account for the level of rainfall and evaporation
prior to this month. I sum the weather data for the 24 months preceding a specific election. For
example, the aridity index of the 2010 presidential election takes into account the sum of the
monthly levels of evaporation and precipitation from November 2008 (exactly one month after
the mayoral election in 2008) through October 2010 (the month of the presidential election).
There are three significant advantages of this measure compared with the standard vari-
7The measure of drought in the studies of Larreguy and Monteiro (2014) and Bobonis et al. (2017) is the
municipal rainfall z-score, i.e., the deviation from the historical mean normalized by the historical standard
deviation. The measure of drought in the study of Rocha and Soares (2015) is a dummy variable that indicates
that rainfall over 12 months was more than one standard deviation below the historical average.
8Since the timing difference between mayoral elections and presidential elections is always two years, the
adoption of this time window of 24 months is convenient.
9This dataset contains an extensive list of weather variables in the period between 1963 to 2013.
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Figure 2
(a) Location of ground stations (b) Average of Aridity Index
(c) Average of Z-score of rainfall (d) Difference in percentile
Note: maps of Brazil divided by states. Figure 2a depicts the location of the INMET ground stations. Figure 2b
represents the average Aridity Index in the period of analysis. Figure 2c depicts the average Z-score of rainfall
during the period of analysis. Figure 2d illustrates the difference of percentile of average Z-score of rainfall and
percentile of average of Aridity Index in the period of study. Municipalities in color white represent areas where
the Z-score of rainfall infer higher propensity of drought compared with the Aridity Index, and cities in black the
other way around.
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ables used for drought in the literature. First, the measure relies on two indicators of water
availability, namely, how much it rains and how much it evaporates. These features are im-
portant because they depict the water storage capacity. Using levels of precipitation alone
provides incomplete information about the soil moisture balance. Second, the measure gives
an intensity indicator that captures how arid a municipality is during a certain period and
distinguishes high humidity areas from desertification areas. Third, the measure is constructed
using ground station data, which provide objective weather information. Rainfall levels are
recorded with a pluviograph, and levels of evaporation are recorded from a Piche evaporime-
ter. These data collection instruments provide meteorological observations that are superior
to widely used satellite data because satellites do not directly measure precipitation and evap-
oration but rather make inferences (Dell et al., 2014).10
Figure 2b depicts the average aridity index from 1998-2012 for the Brazilian territory. The
map confirms that the proposed measure of drought overcomes the problem of misidentifying
water scarcity for areas where such scarcity is unlikely to occur. In fact, a significant part of the
northern region, which is mostly covered by the Amazon rainforest, has an average aridity index
below 0.5. However, the inland regions of the northeast, an area that is commonly associated
with humanitarian crisis because of droughts, has the highest index in the territory. The north
of the southeast region and the south of the center-west region exhibit a high average aridity.
For comparison, Figure 2c shows the average Z-score of rainfall during the period of analysis,
similar to Larreguy and Monteiro (2014) and Bobonis et al. (2017).11 The map indicates
the dispersion of drought propensity throughout the territory, including that in highly humid
areas such as the Amazon rainforest. Figure 2d compares the difference in the percentiles of
average aridity index and average rainfall Z-score for municipalities during the study period.
White areas show the municipalities where the Z-score of rainfall suggests a higher incidence
of drought in comparison to the measure of the aridity index. Black areas indicate otherwise.
In summary, while the aridity index identifies more drought incidence in the Brazilian region
known as semi-arid, the Z-score of precipitation identifies more drought incidence in extremely
humid areas.12
Figure 3 shows how levels of aridity have evolved in time. The positive trend raises concern
about the growth of drought incidence and the spread to areas that never suffered from this
natural disaster before.
For the empirical analysis, I compute the incidence of drought following the generalized
climate classification scheme for values of the global aridity index proposed by Middleton et al.
(1997).13 In the simplest definition, I assume that the variable drought takes a value of one if
10Indeed, the aridity index outperformed the prediction of states of emergency because of drought compared
with measures of drought using satellite datasets such as NOAA’s PRECipitation REConstruction Dataset
(PREC) (Chen et al., 2002) and Terrestrial Precipitation - 1900-2010 Gridded Monthly Time Series (Matsuura
and Willmott, 2013). These results are available upon request.
11High values indicate low precipitation.
12Note that using the Z-score of the aridity index would encounter the same problem described if one uses
the Z-score of rainfall only. That is, the measure could infer that there is a high incidence of drought in highly
humid areas in Brazil.
13Note that my index is equivalent to the inverse of the index of aridity in Middleton et al. (1997). The reason
for this transformation is the ease of interpreting of results. The idea is to make the measurement positively
monotonic with drought.
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Figure 3: Historical Evolution of Average of Aridity Index in Brazil
during the two years preceding each election the aridity index is equal to or higher than 2.14
That is, evaporation was at least twice as large as rainfall. In order to account for nonlinear
effects among different levels of droughts and ensure that a few extreme cases do not drive the
primary results, I split the drought variable into categories. The category extreme takes a
value of one if the index is equal to or higher than 5 and is zero otherwise. The category severe
takes a value of one if the index is equal to or greater than 2 and lower than 5 and is zero
otherwise. Finally, the category moderate takes a value of one if the index is equal to or higher
than 1.59 and lower than 2 and is zero otherwise. In this sense, the measure of water scarcity
informs gradual levels of droughts. Figure 4 shows the kernel density of the aridity index and
presents the drought classification scheme.
Figure 4: Kernel Density of Aridity Index
14The purpose is to make the empirical analysis as readable as possible. The interpretation and statistical
significance of the results are the same if one uses levels of the aridity index.
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3.3 Drought Mitigation Policies
The government’s methods of dealing with the consequences of drought can be assigned into
the following two groups: palliative policies and preventive policies (Cohen and Werker, 2008;
Neumayer et al., 2014). Essentially, palliative policies are designed to serve citizens after an
incidence of drought and have an immediate but short-term effect. In contrast, prevention
policies are intended to mitigate the impact of the future conditions and usually have a long-
term benefit.
In the context of this study, palliative and preventive policies also have different bureaucratic
rigidities. Palliative policies are more bureaucratically loose to carry out, and therefore to
bias, than prevention policies. Additionally, palliative policies are more easily manageable to
promote vote buying. For instance, in addition to instantly diminishing the suffering of the
poor, politicians can also use these palliative grants to buy voter support by sending water
trucks to the appropriate places and by making food distribution conditional on voting for
the national incumbent or at least on turning out on the day of the election. Infrastructure
investments, in turn, are more immobile in space and are thus less flexible for discriminatory
purposes.
Concerning electoral results, both methods may have distinct implications. Palliative poli-
cies may be more salient for voters than prevention policies since the absence of the latter
diminishes voters’ counterfactual perceptions of their situation. From a political economy
perspective, these implications could distort the optimal balance between these policies. For
instance, studying natural disasters in the U.S., Healy and Malhotra (2009) show that voters
reward ruling parties in elections for spending on disaster relief but not for investing in disaster
prevention, leading governments to spend less on the preparation for disasters, thus causing
substantial public welfare losses.
Although the objective of this study is not to determine the best balance between prevention
and palliative policies, I aim to identify how these policies are allocated among municipalities
and how their effects are associated with elections given their different properties. Below, the
construction of proxies for both policies is detailed.
Palliative policy
When a municipality suffers from an extended period of water scarcity that damages the
economy of the locality, the mayor may request emergency aid from higher levels of public
administration (i.e., the state and central governments). To be accepted by the central govern-
ment, this request has to pass through a public administrative bureaucracy. The mayors of the
affected municipalities need to declare a state of emergency because of drought and send docu-
ments and reports to the Ministry of National Integration of Brazil.15 The National Secretariat
of Civil Defence is the agency within the ministry that has the designation of analyzing the
gravity of the drought. This agency comprises a commission that decides whether the mayor’s
request for aid relief is reasonable. All these institutions are politically subordinate to the
15For example, some of these documents are preliminary notifications of disaster, detailed damage reports,
and action plans.
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president. If these institutions agree that providing aid to the municipality is necessary, the
central government publishes an ordinance recognizing the declaration of a state of emergency
or public calamity.16
From this moment, the municipalities for which the state of emergency was recognized
become eligible to receive several types of financial support and bureaucratic relief. In cases
of drought, federal aid relief may arrive in the form of emergency funding through so-called
mandatory transfers, the supply of water trucks, food distribution, the waiver of legal bureau-
cratic procedures for public spending, the renegotiation of agriculture debts, and permission
for citizens withdraw money from labor insurance (FGTS).
I extract from Sistema Integrado de Informac¸o˜es sobre Desastres Naturais (S2ID) the cen-
tral government ordinances recognizing the declaration of the state of emergency by drought
for the period 1993 - 2013. Unfortunately, there is no information available on the monetary
amount disbursed for each instance of emergency aid.
I use in my analyses a dummy variable that is a proxy for palliative policy. This variable
takes a value of 1 if there was a recognition of the state of emergency because of drought for up
to two years before the specific election in question (mayoral election or presidential election)
and is 0 otherwise.
Prevention policy
One of the principal forms of transferring resources for infrastructure investments between
the central government and municipal governments is through the so-called Conveˆnios. These
plans function as agreements between different levels of public administration and usually
serve as a means of promoting the decentralization of public expenditure on projects related
to physical facilities and structures. This modality of intergovernmental transfer is the most
commonly adopted to implement long-lasting public policies to fight the effects of droughts.
I gather detailed data from 461, 958 Conveˆnios projects that were implemented between
the years 1995 and 2014. Among these projects, I identified 2,023 that have included in their
project scopes the construction or maintenance of water dams, barrages for lakes, cisterns,
and water distribution systems. These types of public works have minimal effects in situations
where drought is already present but are intended to relieve the aftermath of future droughts.
The average execution time on these kinds of projects is one year and six months, and
the average amount of money spent is US 120, 000.00, an increase of approximately 9% in the
annual budget of a medium-sized municipality.17
I use in my analyses a dummy variable that is a proxy for prevention policy. This variable
takes a value of 1 if one such project was implemented up to two years before the specific
election in question and is 0 otherwise. It is reasonable to suppose that prevention policies
are likely to provide spillover effects on neighboring municipalities. After all, in times of crisis,
people can commute a short distance to the nearest source of water. To take into account
this possibility, I also expand my definition of municipalities that have benefited from drought
16A state of emergency because of drought was first proposed in 1962 by Celso Furtado, at the time the chair
of SUDENE (Superintendeˆncia do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste), in Resolution No: 453.
17Prices deflated by the IPCA (IBGE) with the base year 2000, which represents approximately R$ 380, 000.00.
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prevention policies to include those localities that are located at a maximum distance of 30 km
from the centroid of the municipality in which the project was originally addressed.18
3.4 Municipality Characteristics
To ensure that the effect of droughts does not incorporate time-varying characteristics of mu-
nicipalities, I gather information from the 1991, 2000 and 2010 population censuses conducted
by the Brazilian Bureau of Statistics (IBGE), and then, I extrapolate these data to election
years. More specifically, I control for production structure by introducing variables such as the
share of workers in the agricultural sector and the industrial sector. The average income con-
trols the welfare of a municipality. The GINI coefficient controls the inequality. The proportion
of graduates controls the level of human capital.
Additionally, I also gather information on the size of the municipal population from Tesouro
Nacional FINBRA and the share of voters below 18 years old from Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.19
The average temperature is collected from INMET. For these variables, extrapolations are not
needed. In the empirical analyses, the control variables used are lagged for two years (the
initial condition before drought shock) and log transformed. Because state capital cities have
special political designations, these cities are dropped from the database. Table 1 depicts the
summary statistics.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Dependent variable: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Vote share of mayor’s party 0.268 0.271 0.000 1.000 22,099
Vote share of president’s party 0.500 0.192 0.022 0.950 21,712
Palliative policy before presidential elections 0.189 0.391 0 1 50,436
Palliative policy before mayoral elections 0.264 0.441 0 1 50,436
Prevention policy before presidential elections 0.104 0.306 0 1 50,456
Prevention policy before mayoral elections 0.144 0.351 0 1 50,446
Weather variables: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Aridity Index (AI) 1.305 1.043 0.133 15.625 50,436
Drought 0.153 0.360 0 1 50,436
Categories:
Extreme drought 0.013 0.113 0 1 50,436
Severe drought 0.140 0.347 0 1 50,436
Moderate drought 0.083 0.276 0 1 50,436
Temperature 23.164 3.055 13.299 29.737 50,436
Forcing variables: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Margin of victory before presidential elections 0.003 0.247 -0.988 0.938 2,549
Margin of victory before mayoral elections -0.029 0.257 -0.988 0.938 2,018
Municipalities characteristics Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Share of workers in agriculture sector 16.227% 9.355 0% 72.294% 44,314
Share of workers in industry sector 4.764% 4.580 0% 40.880% 44,314
Population 24,693 56,820 163 1,251,831 47,536
Average income R$ 660.01 R$ 358.37 R$ 29.84 R$ 7,726.86 44,314
Share of graduated citizens 2.228% 1.944 0% 24.212% 44,314
GINI coefficient 0.528 0.066 0.261 0.880 47,285
Share of voters below 18 years old 3.337% 1.455 0.059% 11.355% 49,645
18The results do not change when using a maximum distance of either 10 km or 50 km.
19Voting is optional for Brazilians between 16 and 18 years.
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4 Droughts, Mitigation Policies, and Electoral Results
To demonstrate why politicians should be concerned about the incidence of natural disasters
and how voters react to the actions of central government, I investigate in this section the
relationship between droughts, mitigation policies, and electoral outcomes in presidential and
mayoral elections in Brazil, both at the municipality level. More specifically, I test the hy-
potheses that severe droughts adversely affect the parties in office in subsequent elections and
that mitigation policies, conditioned on drought, have a positive influence on the re-election
performance of incumbents.
Methodology
To adequately address the first hypothesis, I propose the following econometric specification:
SVt,m = αDt,m + γXt−2,m + fm + ft + t,m. (2)
where SVtm represents the share of the vote for the incumbent party in election t and in
municipality m. The term D indicates the set of variables that reflect water scarcity during
the two years prior to the election. X represents a number of control variables lagged two years
before the corresponding election. The terms fm and ft are a municipality fixed effect and year
fixed effect, respectively. The term  is the error.
Such specification captures the effect of droughts using within-municipality variation. The
underlying assumption here is that weather conditions over two years preceding an election are
exogenous to the political dispute. This assumption is reasonable because it is hard to argue
that there is an omitted factor that could drive the vote share of the incumbent party and
the levels of rainfall and evaporation simultaneously. Indeed, several studies relied on a similar
assumption to identify the causal effect of natural disasters on economic outcomes (Kahn, 2005;
Stro¨mberg, 2007; Yamamura, 2014; Felbermayr and Gro¨schl, 2014; Neumayer et al., 2014).
Subsequently, I examine the hypothesis that the promulgation of public policies to fight
droughts would reduce the negative impact these natural events may have on re-election. If
voters indeed punish incumbent political parties because of droughts, it is to be expected
that this effect will be exacerbated in places that have not received government assistance.
Therefore, I introduce interaction variables in the previous econometric model as follows:
SVt,m = αDt,m + δPt,m + β(Dt,m ∗ Pt,m) + γXt−2,m + fm + ft + t,m. (3)
Where Pt,m expresses whether a municipality has received a drought mitigation policy. I
study the palliative policies and prevention policies separately. β is the coefficient of interest
that expresses the heterogeneous correlation of the impact of drought on the municipalities
benefiting from each type of public policy.20
20One could be concerned as to whether drought and palliative policies suffer from multicollinearity. However,
this is not the case because there is no particular rule for the recognition of a state of emergency, and the
conditions for this declaration turn out to be subjective. The pairwise correlation between palliative policies
and the aridity index is only 0.36, so estimations should not suffer from multicollinearity. Still, my measure
of drought has the highest correlation between palliative policies compared to other indexes of droughts. For
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This coefficient must be interpreted with care. Although the estimation extracts the co-
efficient from the within-municipality variation and controls for the common yearly shocks as
well as a set of covariates, it is still unable to rule out the hypothesis that there is an un-
observable time-variant characteristic that drives the allocation of these public policies. The
results should be taken only as suggestive rather than causal. For instance, it is well docu-
mented that political alignment is a determinant of the allocation of public policy, and this
dynamic may also influence election results, which in turn may bias the coefficient (Sole´-Olle´
and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012). I will address this issue explicitly
later in the paper. However, it would be informative to construct a horse race for the effects
of policy design on election results and make a comparative analysis.
Results
There are four takeaways from the analyses. First, the results confirm that droughts have an
adverse impact on incumbent parties in elections. Moreover, the findings suggest that voters are
likely to blame the local politicians and the central government alike for water shortages. In a
way, this result could enigmatically stem from a voter rationality perspective since mayors have
less decision-making power than presidents to implement preparedness policies and immediate
aid relief in the aftermath of a drought. Nevertheless, this evidence could be explained by the
citizen’s perceptions of their proximity to public agents. An uprising against local politicians
could be more effective since they usually live in the same city and are more tangible, whereas
bureaucrats in higher levels of public administration usually live in capital cities that are
generally distant.
Second, voters reward the incumbent party for the delivery of mitigation policies. Such a
reward seems to be more sensitive to short-term relief spending than investments in drought
preparedness spending. This finding suggests that if the central government has opportunistic
and partisan motivations and selects policies so as to maximize electoral outcomes, it would be
wise to focus more on palliative policies when allocating strategically among municipalities.
Third, the effectiveness of the use of drought mitigation policies as a strategic tool to reduce
voter dissatisfaction in certain municipalities appears only for presidential elections, whereas
this effect is absent in municipal elections. One could expect that the mayor’s party might
reap some electoral benefit from an additional expenditure financed by higher levels of public
administration if voters are unsure about the source of the government spending. As this is not
the case, an alternative explanation may be that citizens are sufficiently able to disentangle the
provision of public goods by the central government from that by the municipal government.
Reconciling these findings with the assumption that voters are irrational is difficult.
Fourth, the findings demonstrate that the effect of aid relief is not high enough for a net
increase in popularity. Previous works have shown that the government’s responsiveness implies
a gain in voter gratitude to the extent that negative shocks from natural disasters disappear
completely until these events become beneficial for the incumbent (Bechtel and Hainmueller,
instance, the pairwise correlation with the Z-Score of rainfall is 0.08, and the correlation with rainfall that is
one standard deviation below the mean precipitation is 0.02.
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2011; Gasper and Reeves, 2011; Lazarev et al., 2014). This dynamic does not apply for droughts
in Brazil. The provision of palliative and prevention policy compensates for the negative shock
of droughts, but this compensation is not enough to result in an increase in the vote share.21
Table 2
Dependent variable: vote share of president’s party




Extreme -0.209*** -0.131*** -0.251***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.021)
Severe -0.059*** -0.012 -0.036***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Moderate -0.011** 0.011** 0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Interactions between policies and drought:
Palliative x Drought 0.065***
(0.008)
Prevention x Drought 0.021**
(0.010)
Interactions between policies and categories of drought:
Palliative x Extreme 0.114***
(0.019)
Palliative x Severe 0.063***
(0.009)
Palliative x Moderate 0.008
(0.010)
Prevention x Extreme 0.133***
(0.020)
Prevention x Severe 0.008
(0.011)
Prevention x Moderate -0.016
(0.012)
Observations 21,712 21,712 19,343 19,343 19,343
R-squared 0.447 0.455 0.503 0.504 0.511
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: the analyses use data for presidential elections of 1998, 2002, 2006, and
2010. Municipalities and years fixed effects included in all specifications. Controls
variables are lagged two years before each election and include population, average
income, GINI coefficient, the share of graduated citizens, the share of voters
below 18 years old, the proportion of workers in agriculture and industry sector,
palliative policy, and prevention policy. Standard error clustered at municipality
level in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.
Interpreting the results in detail, Table 2 depicts the findings using the vote share of the
incumbent party in presidential elections as the dependent variable. Column (1) shows that a
drought decreases the vote share of the incumbent party by an average of five percentage points.
Column (2) suggests that such an effect is nonlinear regarding the intensity of water scarcity.
While extreme droughts decrease the vote share of the presidential party by an average of twenty
percentage points, severe droughts and moderate droughts result in a six percentage points and
one percentage point decrease, respectively. Column (3) confirms that the nonlinear effect holds
even when including time-varying covariates. Column (4) includes interactions between the
incidence of drought and policies aimed at mitigating the consequences of drought. The results
21This conclusion holds even for municipalities that have received the palliative and preventive policies simul-
taneously. The triple interaction between drought and the two type of policies is statistically insignificant. The
results are available upon request.
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show that such policies indeed, on average, counteract the adverse impact that an incumbent
party in central government would face if voters suffered from water shortages. Column (5)
shows that even though voters experiencing an extreme drought react positively to the delivery
of palliative and prevention policies by eleven and thirteen percentage points, respectively, the
overall impact is still negative. When voters are subjected to a severe drought, only palliative
policies appear to be relevant to the electoral outcome. In the case of moderate droughts,
mitigation policies do not appear to be relevant at all. These findings suggest that from the
perspective of the central government, the allocation of palliative policy against drought is
potentially more rewarding with respect to electoral outcomes than preventive policy, which is
in line with the results in Healy and Malhotra (2009).
Table 3
Dependent variable: vote share of mayor’s party




Extreme -0.131*** -0.100*** -0.039
(0.032) (0.033) (0.072)
Severe -0.080*** -0.070*** -0.071***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.021)
Moderate -0.011 -0.007 -0.008
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Interactions between policies and drought:
Palliative x Drought 0.001
(0.015)
Permanent x Drought 0.012
(0.018)
Interactions between policies and categories of drought:
Palliative x Extreme -0.008
(0.071)
Palliative x Severe 0.008
(0.016)
Palliative x Moderate 0.008
(0.016)
Prevention x Extreme -0.143***
(0.053)
Prevention x Severe 0.019
(0.020)
Prevention x Moderate -0.015
(0.025)
Observations 22,099 22,099 19,585 19,585 19,585
R-squared 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.021
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: the analyses use data for mayoral elections of 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012.
Municipalities and years fixed effects included in all specifications. Controls vari-
ables are lagged two years before each election and include population, average
income, GINI coefficient, the share of graduated citizens, the share of voters be-
low 18 years old, the proportion of workers in agriculture and industry sector,
palliative policy, and prevention policy. Standard error clustered at municipality
level in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.
Regarding municipal elections, Table 3 shows the results using the vote share of the mayor’s
party as the dependent variable. Column (1) confirms that drought is harmful to the re-election
efforts of the party of the mayor. The incidence of drought decreases, on average, the vote
share of the mayor’s party by seven percentage points. Although this negative shock seems
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to grow according to drought levels, the hypothesis that the effect is linear cannot be ruled
out, as observed in column (2). Column (3) reaches a similar conclusion once time-varying
covariates are included. Concerning the allocation of mitigation policies, column (4) provides
different evidence from what was found in presidential elections. Neither palliative policies
nor prevention policies appear to deter voter anger in local elections. Surprisingly, column
(5) exhibits a negative correlation between the provision of prevention policies and the vote
share of the incumbent in municipalities that suffer from extreme drought. This result could
be explained by the electorate believing that the prevention policies implemented were useless
given the scale of the environmental catastrophe.
In sum, these findings are in line with those in the economics and political science literature.
The results of this work reinforce and extend the validity of previous work by showing that
there is gratitude from the electorate for the government’s response following natural disasters,
and by showing that the reaction of voters is nonlinear in the severity of natural disasters.
5 Allocation of Drought Mitigation Policies
In the structure of Brazilian federalism, the central government has the greatest decision-
making authority to intervene in areas devastated by drought. Given that high levels of water
scarcity are also bad news for the electoral future of politicians in office, the central government
could bias particular policies towards aligned municipalities. There may be different impetuses
in mayoral compared to presidential elections. The discretionary allocation of public resources
can be accomplished through the recognition of a state of emergency or an agreement through
Conveˆnios for investment in infrastructure. The distortion in these policies in favor of specific
political parties penalizes the efficient provision of public goods. To rigorously investigate the
veracity of the aforementioned assertion, I examine the effect of political alignment on the
provision of drought mitigation policies.
Methodology
The methodological challenge comes from the fact that political preferences could be associ-
ated with several confounding factors that would bias the analysis. Thus, the most appropriate
way to extract the causal impact of political alignment is to analyze the municipalities that met
the following condition in the previous municipal elections: the two candidates with the most
votes are from the party of the president and a party in the opposition coalition, as in Brollo
and Nannicini (2012).22 The underlying assumption is that in elections where the margin of
victory is very small, the only difference between the treatment groups and control groups is
party alignment with the central government, and all the confounding factors are randomly
assigned around the threshold of winning an election.23 More specifically, I implement the
22An alternative condition is a restriction of the sample to municipalities in which only two candidates ran in
the previous municipal election, one of whom is in the same party as the incumbent president. The results are
qualitatively and statistically the same, and they are available upon request.
23The validity of such an assumption could be tested using municipality characteristics as dependent variables.
Appendix C shows the graphs of this test.
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following regression discontinuity design (RDD):








p] + m. (4)
Where Pm represents whether a municipality m received palliative or prevention policies
during the two years before an election. The term MV is the forcing variable that represents
the margin of victory of the candidate for mayor of the president’s party in the previous
mayoral election. The term T accounts for the treatment effect to be aligned with the central
government. Naturally, T assumes a value of one if and only if MV > 0. Such specification
allows for local or global polynomial order (p) in the forcing variable on both sides of the
threshold 0. The coefficient α gives the local average treatment effect (LATE) of political
alignment on receiving federal drought relief (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
I implement two criteria to deal with the traditional trade-off between the size of bandwidth
around the threshold and the polynomial order of the forcing variable when executing the RDD.
First, I select arbitrarily elections in which the margin of victory is between −50% and 50%
(excluding cases where the margin of victory is extremely high). Then, I regress for different
degrees of polynomial order of the forcing variable, allowing different shapes on both sides of
the threshold. I use first-, second-, third-, and fourth-order polynomials and select the one that
minimizes the AIC criteria (Akaike, 1974). Second, I use the bandwidth selectors proposed by
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and Calonico et al. (2014) and use the local polynomial with
a rectangular kernel.
Additionally, I investigate whether politically-motivated allocation is heterogeneous across
levels of water scarcity. Depending on the type of election that is approaching, the drought
may exacerbate or reduce the central government bias. Put another way, the effect of polit-
ical alignment could be directed towards a particular set of municipalities depending on the
magnitude of the drought. I implement an RDD with heterogeneous treatment effects that
provide a heterogeneous local average treatment effect (HLATE) but with a less conservative
specification proposed by Becker et al. (2013). Instead of just allowing different shapes on both
side of the threshold of the forcing variable regarding the treatment effect, I also allow different









Where the coefficient ϑ indicates the local probability of receiving mitigation policy if a
municipality suffers a certain degree of drought. The coefficient θ represents the heterogeneous
local average treatment effect (HLATE) of party alignment when a municipality experiences a
certain degree of drought. The linear combination of coefficients ϑ, α, and θ informs the local
probability of receiving drought mitigation policy when a municipality suffers a certain degree
of drought, and the incumbent mayor is in the same party of the current president of Brazil.24
24The results are equivalent in terms of sign and have more statistical power if we strictly follow the econometric
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There are three important underlying assumptions required to implement this identification
strategy. First, the covariates are continuous, and there is no jump at the threshold. Second,
there is continuity in the probability of the degree of droughts at the threshold to capture
genuine variation in the interaction with party alignment. Third, the interactions between the
degree of drought and party alignment are not correlated with the error term, conditional on
the margin of victory (Becker et al., 2013). The first two assumptions are tested in Appendix
C. The latter assumption relies on the exogenous characteristic of weather variables and the
fact that the electoral victory of aligned parties is controlled by the forcing variable margin of
victory. The McCrary (2008) test of the forcing variables depicted in Figure 5. It can be seen
that for both forcing variables, there is a smooth distribution around the threshold of zero,
which rules out sorting concerns.
Figure 5
(a) Before presidential elections (b) Before mayoral elections
Note: The x-axis is the forcing variable margin of victory of mayor candidate in the president’s party in the
previous municipal election.
Results
The analyses prove that there is a tremendous advantage for voters that experience a
water shortage in having an incumbent mayor who is aligned with the central government.
Such a feature is strikingly important for receiving palliative policies. However, the same is not
applicable for policies that have long-run effects and is less immediately noticeable for the poor.
In short, when water scarcity reaches a critical level in which thirst and famine forces citizens
into extreme attitudes, such as blocking roads to plunder necessary supplies, the marginal effect
of government assistance makes a big difference. Hence, a political alliance between the levels
of government becomes a strong factor. The patronage relationship in the provision of drought
palliative policies seems to persist.
Demonstrating the interpretation of the results, Figure 6 provides a graphical analysis of
the effect of party alignment on the provision of palliative policy against droughts. Although
specification proposed in Becker et al. (2013). However, their specification is rigid in the sense that they do not
admit the margin of vote share to have a distinct prediction for municipalities that suffered from droughts and
municipalities that did not.
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the coefficient for party alignment is larger when the election following the delivery of palliative
policy is the presidential election, the effect for both types of electoral contest is not statistically
significant at usual standards. Figure 7 shows similar results for the case of prevention policy.
Figure 6: Graphical Analysis of RDD: Alignment on Palliative Policy
(a) Before presidential elections (b) Before mayoral elections
Note: The x-axis is the margin of victory of mayor candidate in the president’s party in the previous municipal
election. The y-axis of Figure 6a is the probability of receiving palliative policy before presidential elections.
The y-axis of Figure 6b is the probability of receiving palliative policy before mayoral elections.
Figure 7: Graphical Analysis of RDD: Alignment on Prevention Policy
(a) Before presidential elections (b) Before mayoral elections
Note: The x-axis is the margin of victory of mayor candidate in the president’s party in the previous municipal
election. The y-axis of Figure 7a is the probability of receiving prevention policy before presidential elections.
The y-axis of Figure 7b is the probability of receiving prevention policy before mayoral elections.
In order to dig a little more into whether there is a political bias towards a set of ar-
eas depending on the level of water scarcity, Table 4 shows the results of the heterogeneous
treatment effects of political alignment. Panel A depicts the results for palliative policy before
presidential elections. Columns (1), (2), and (3) use the three proposed criteria for the simplest
definition of drought. The results indicate that the central government distributes palliative
policy opportunistically following a pattern. The president prioritizes aligned municipalities
in the event that the environmental condition is acute. Given a drought, an aligned city has
an approximately 18 - 36 percentage points greater chance of receiving assistance from the
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Table 4: Palliative Policies Before Elections
Panel A
Dependent variable: palliative policy before election for president
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party alignment -0.032 0.013 0.016 -0.013 -0.010 -0.007
(0.025) (0.042) (0.043) (0.035) (0.044) (0.044)
Party alignment x Drought 0.181** 0.343** 0.358**
(0.087) (0.145) (0.147)
Drought 0.196*** 0.109 0.083
(0.060) (0.103) (0.103)
Categories of drought:
Party alignment x Extreme 0.519** 0.738*** 0.736***
(0.259) (0.273) (0.273)
Party alignment x Severe 0.236* 0.287* 0.300*
(0.135) (0.163) (0.165)
Party alignment x Moderate 0.192 0.239 0.237
(0.134) (0.155) (0.155)
Extreme 0.162 -0.014 -0.012
(0.200) (0.209) (0.209)
Severe 0.137 0.112 0.085
(0.093) (0.112) (0.114)
Moderate -0.071 -0.077 -0.075
(0.082) (0.088) (0.088)
Observations 2,395 1,165 1,152 2,395 1,165 1,152
R-squared 0.104 0.089 0.093 0.121 0.097 0.101
Polynomial order 1 1 1 2 1 1
Bandwidith 0.500 0.120 0.118 0.500 0.120 0.118
Procedure CTT IK CTT IK
AIC 1943.09 1920.045
Panel B
Dependent variable: palliative policy before election for mayor
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Party alignment -0.031 -0.009 0.018 -0.017 0.005 0.025
(0.040) (0.039) (0.052) (0.040) (0.039) (0.052)
Party alignment x Drought 0.100 -0.018 0.139
(0.151) (0.143) (0.189)
Drought 0.316*** 0.390*** 0.432***
(0.095) (0.093) (0.127)
Categories of drought:
Party alignment x Extreme -0.516 -0.633 -0.707
(0.640) (0.461) (0.674)
Party alignment x Severe 0.108 0.011 0.161
(0.156) (0.148) (0.193)
Party alignment x Moderate -0.102 -0.141 -0.024
(0.154) (0.150) (0.202)
Extreme 0.690 0.544* 0.360
(0.463) (0.328) (0.527)
Severe 0.328*** 0.405*** 0.450***
(0.097) (0.096) (0.130)
Moderate 0.155 0.159 0.145
(0.104) (0.105) (0.131)
Observations 1,868 1,327 838 1,868 1,327 838
R-squared 0.160 0.158 0.123 0.188 0.185 0.141
Polynomial order 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidith 0.500 0.197 0.104 0.5 0.197 0.104
Procedure CTT IK CTT IK
AIC 1673.608 1636.946
Note: forcing variable is the vote margin of victory of the candidate for mayor in the president’s
party in the previous municipal election. In columns (1), (4), (7) and (10) the bandwidth
is chosen arbitrarily and the polynomial order of forcing variable is chosen by AIC criteria.
The columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) use bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico et al. (2014)
(CTT ). The columns (3), (6), (9) and (12) use the bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK ). Robust standard error in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, **
p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.
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Table 5: Prevention Policies Before Elections
Panel A
Dependent variable: prevention policy before election for president
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party alignment 0.019 0.036 0.036 0.025 0.034 0.038
(0.018) (0.028) (0.030) (0.017) (0.025) (0.026)
Party alignment x Drought -0.052 -0.075 0.017
(0.086) (0.136) (0.146)
Drought 0.397*** 0.428*** 0.382***
(0.060) (0.097) (0.105)
Categories of drought:
Party alignment x Extreme 0.229 0.028 0.299
(0.199) (0.291) (0.307)
Party alignment x Severe -0.107 -0.080 -0.030
(0.094) (0.150) (0.160)
Party alignment x Moderate -0.040 0.022 -0.023
(0.098) (0.164) (0.181)
Extreme 0.131 0.206 0.081
(0.139) (0.195) (0.210)
Severe 0.464*** 0.494*** 0.468***
(0.065) (0.106) (0.113)
Moderate 0.203*** 0.259** 0.296**
(0.072) (0.121) (0.131)
Observations 2,395 1,393 1,240 2,395 1,393 1,240
R-squared 0.172 0.164 0.165 0.195 0.189 0.192
Polynomial order 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidith 0.500 0.151 0.129 0.500 0.151 0.129
Procedure CTT IK CTT IK
AIC 1041.097 1002.844
Panel B
Dependent variable: prevention policy before election for mayor
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Party alignment 0.016 0.033 0.036 0.025 0.032 0.038
(0.020) (0.026) (0.031) (0.019) (0.024) (0.028)
Party alignment x Drought -0.121 -0.043 -0.021
(0.104) (0.142) (0.166)
Drought 0.419*** 0.450*** 0.451***
(0.065) (0.090) (0.107)
Categories of drought:
Party alignment x Extreme -0.024 -0.028 -1.286**
(0.394) (0.467) (0.628)
Party alignment x Severe -0.122 -0.045 -0.017
(0.108) (0.148) (0.171)
Party alignment x Moderate -0.060 0.018 -0.003
(0.088) (0.119) (0.144)
Extreme -0.119 0.333 0.524
(0.282) (0.310) (0.525)
Severe 0.463*** 0.481*** 0.480***
(0.066) (0.093) (0.110)
Moderate 0.204*** 0.139* 0.117
(0.061) (0.080) (0.090)
Observations 1,868 1,361 1,064 1,868 1,361 1,064
R-squared 0.126 0.138 0.141 0.152 0.165 0.171
Polynomial order 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidith 0.500 0.207 0.143 0.500 0.207 0.143
Procedure CTT IK CTT IK
AIC 718.4768 688.3544
Note: forcing variable is the vote margin of victory of the candidate for mayor in the president’s
party in the previous municipal election. In columns (1), (4), (7) and (10) the bandwidth
is chosen arbitrarily and the polynomial order of forcing variable is chosen by AIC criteria.
The columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) use bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico et al. (2014)
(CTT ). The columns (3), (6), (9) and (12) use the bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK ). Robust standard error in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, **
p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.
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central government. This effect is more than 70 percent greater than the average probability
of receiving a palliative policy. Columns (4), (5), and (6) show the results once the drought
variable is decomposed into categories. The sizes of the effects are astonishing. Aligned mu-
nicipalities experiencing an extreme case of drought have an approximately 51 - 73 percentage
points greater chance of receiving immediate relief compared to municipalities where the in-
cumbent mayor is in the opposition coalition. In the case of severe drought, the chances are
approximately 23 - 30 percentage points higher. Moderate drought has similar coefficients, but
these are not statistically significant. Panel B of the same table shows the results for palliative
policy before mayoral elections. In this case, party alignment seems to not play a role in the
allocation of instantaneous aid relief. The linear combination of the party alignment variable
and its interaction with drought has no statistical significance in any specification. In fact, the
drought variable alone seems to be responsible for a large part of the predictive power in the
econometric model, which suggests that the behavior of the central government is responsible,
as seen in columns (7), (8) and (9). The same conclusion is reached when the results are
observed in the categories of droughts, in columns (10), (11) and (12).
The results of party alignment heterogeneous effects for droughts on prevention policy are
depicted in the Table 5. For this kind of policy, the central government does not seem to have
any partisan or opportunistic conduct. In both types of electoral contest, neither the party
alignment variable nor the linear combination with its interaction with droughts have sizable
or statistically significant impacts. The only exception is the interaction between extreme
droughts and party alignment, which has an unstable coefficient and is likely to be dictated by
a just few observations.
These findings corroborate the results of previous academic works supporting that political
alignment is an important determinant in the allocation of targeted public good. What can
also be learned from this exercise is that the government seems to be more opportunistic than
partisan, and therefore, the type of election matters. In addition, governments are more likely
to bias the distribution of more immediate and less bureaucratic spending than long-term and
bureaucratically rigid spending.
6 Voters Sometimes Demand Clientelism
The two last sections have demonstrated that although high levels of water scarcity have
adverse effects on incumbents, citizens living in areas in which the mayor and the president are
aligned have a significant gain in terms of the probability of receiving immediate aid from the
central government in times of drought. From the voters’ point of view, this dynamic creates
a situation that requires a decision between opposing alternatives. The failure to implement
adaptive policies to mitigate the effects of droughts would be a motivation to punish the
incumbent in the subsequent election. However, in a scenario in which there is already a
party alignment between the two levels of government, punishing the incumbent, and thereby
changing the party in power, would result in fewer chances to obtain palliative policies. I
address the outcome of these two antagonistic motivations in this section. More specifically,
the two key questions are as follows: do voters comprehend the benefit of political alignment
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and vote in favor of this alignment in elections? Given a voter’s perception of the political
alignment advantage, what is the effect of actual drought on this perception? In the next two
subsections, I address these points.
6.1 Voter Assessment of Political Alignment
Voters can appraise two kinds of political alignment. In municipal elections, voters evaluate
whether to vote for the incumbent mayor who is aligned with the central government taking
into account the expected benefit from such an action. Meanwhile, in presidential elections,
voters evaluate whether the maintenance of the incumbent president’s party is relevant given
that their mayor is in the same party as the central government. The importance of party
alliance may be different in each situation. In one case, the voter decides the party at the top
of the state, and in the other circumstance, the voter chooses the party lower in the hierarchy.
In this subsection, I first analyze whether party alignment per se is relevant to voter behavior.
Methodology
Similar to the previous section, I implement an RDD, as in equation 4. Nevertheless, the
dependent variable in this empirical strategy is SVm, which assumes the share of the vote
for the mayor’s party when analyzing municipal elections and the share of the vote for the
president’s party when analyzing federal elections. The rest of the approach remains the same.
Results
It could be inferred that voters assess political alignment positively in municipal elections
but do not mind such alignment in presidential elections. Figure 8a gives a graphical analysis of
the political alignment advantage for presidential elections. It can be seen that in this kind of
election, party alignment does not seem to play any role. The predicted vote share of the pres-
ident’s party is flat across the threshold of the forcing variable. Voters are indifferent whether
the incumbent president is in the same party as the mayor or not. A different conclusion is
reached when I analyze the party alignment advantage for mayoral elections. The results can
be examined graphically in Figure 8b. The upward jump in predicted vote share around the
threshold suggests a large party alignment advantage. In this case, alignment between the local
and federal parties increases the vote share of the incumbent party in the municipal contest by
approximately 17 percentage points.
There are at least two possible explanations for the results. The first reason is related to the
federative structure of Brazilian public administration. Since the municipal budget is mainly
formed by transfers from the central government, mayors are dependent on higher levels of
executive power. Therefore, the alliance with the central government in municipal elections is
expected to have a significant advantage. This expectation is consistent with the system of
patronage between different levels of public administration in order to ensure the flow of federal
revenues (Brollo and Nannicini, 2012). The second possible explanation is related to group
rule-utilitarian theory (Coate and Conlin, 2004), which suggests that in municipal elections,
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Figure 8: Graphical Analysis of RDD: Alignment on Election
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Note: The x-axis is the margin of victory of mayor candidate in the president’s party in the previous municipal
election. The y-axis of Figure 8a is the vote share of president’s party in federal elections. The y-axis of Figure
8b is the vote share of mayor’s party in municipal elections.
individual voters can more easily identify themselves as members of a group of citizens, organize
themselves strategically, and then do their part to help their group win. A strategic vote is less
likely to happen in national elections because the heterogeneity of individuals is sufficiently
large to prevent a voter bloc from forming in larger contests. Thus, voters might behave more
strategically in municipal elections than in national elections, and the importance of political
alignment for a group of citizens is taken into account in their voting decisions.
6.2 Droughts Impact on Voter Assessment of Political Alignment
Bearing in mind the assessment of party alignment, what would be the influence of the water
shortage on the voting strategy of citizens and subsequently on the chances of re-electing the
incumbent? As droughts expand economic vulnerability, voters might increase their demand
for individualistic transactions and place even more value in the party alliance advantage. One
possible way to test this hypothesis is to examine whether party alignment has a heterogeneous
effect among municipalities regarding incidents of drought.
Methodology
Two feasible methodologies could provide both informative and distinct answers. The
first is a fixed effects panel data model, similar to equation 2. The difference in this case is
that the interactions are between levels of water scarcity and party alignment. Remember,
the coefficients of such a specification should be interpreted as a global average correlation.
Because political preferences are not randomly assigned, causal interpretation has to be avoided.
Second, in order to employ political alignment as if this effect were exogenous, I implement
a regression discontinuity design analysis with heterogeneous treatment effects, as in equation
5. The coefficients express the causal average local effect. However, since in this analysis, the
impact extracted applies to a particular type of municipality that has the largest share of swing
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voters, the results raise external validation concerns.
Results
There are three important conclusions from the findings. First, the results confirm that the
effect of drought on the vote share of the politically aligned incumbent party would be different
in each kind of election. An aligned mayor’s party in a municipal election is rewarded, and an
aligned president’s party in a federal election is not. Second, voters act more strategically in
mayoral elections than in presidential elections. Voters perceive that is important to maintain
mayors who are aligned with the president to maximize their chances of being assisted with
drought relief. Third, although both applied methodologies are based on completely different
assumptions and provide a distinct interpretation of results, the global average effects, and the
causal local average treatment effects are very similar, suggesting that both causal inference
and external validation can be applied with some reasonableness. So, when there is an extended
period of water shortage, voters might ponder the value of immediate aid relief, rewarding, even
more, political alignment in the municipal contest. Thus, voters boost patronage relations by
rewarding political linkages between levels of the state’s hierarchy. In presidential elections,
however, there is no clear incentive for voters to act strategically.
To be more precise, Table 6 shows the results for presidential elections. Columns (1) and
(2) depict the results of the interaction between party alignment and drought extracted from
the fixed effects panel data model with and without controls, respectively. As a global average,
the correlation of party alignment in municipalities affected by drought decreases the vote
share of the incumbent party by approximately 12 percentage points. Columns (5)-(7) depict
the coefficients extracted from the regression discontinuity design analysis with heterogeneous
treatment effects. The findings are very similar. The local causal impact of party alignment
when there is a water shortage decreases the incumbent party vote share by approximately
9 to 12 percentage points. Splitting the drought variable into categories provides a coherent
interpretation of what was found. Columns (3) and (4) suggest no differences in effects among
extreme and severe droughts. The correlations account for approximately 11 to 13 percentage
points of the incumbent party vote share. The moderate category has a tiny and insignificant
effect. The effects are larger in columns (8)-(10), which depict the results from RDD. In
the cities near the cut-off point of the previous margin of victory, the causal effect of drought
combined with party alignment is negatively strong, approximately 30 and 32 percentage points
for extreme droughts. However, the hypothesis of linearity between the categories cannot be
rejected.
The results are inverted when I study the elections for mayor. Table 7 shows the results.
Instead of punishing the incumbent party that is aligned with the president for the impacts of a
drought, voters switch to voting for the re-election of this party. In other words, voters reward
political alignment when they experience a drought. In the columns (1) and (2), the global
average correlation of party alignment and drought increases the vote share of the mayor’s
party by approximately 7 percentage points. Columns (5)-(7) present the results of the RDD
that deal with causality issues. The effects are slightly larger, 9 to 12 percentage points. When
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Table 6
Dependent variable: vote share of president’s party
Fixed-effects model RDD for HLATE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Party alignment 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.037*** -0.046** -0.030 -0.023 -0.027 -0.015 -0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Party alignment x Drought -0.128*** -0.121*** -0.096 -0.109 -0.121*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.073) (0.071) (0.074)
Drought -0.034*** -0.003 0.001 0.023 0.032
(0.007) (0.007) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052)
Categories of drought:
Party alignment x Extreme -0.112*** -0.129*** -0.322** -0.300** -0.296**
(0.028) (0.027) (0.152) (0.129) (0.147)
Party alignment x Severe -0.124*** -0.115*** -0.093 -0.094 -0.109
(0.014) (0.014) (0.081) (0.079) (0.082)
Party alignment x Moderate -0.017 -0.015 -0.203** -0.161** -0.145*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.079) (0.077) (0.081)
Extreme -0.187*** -0.109*** 0.122 0.102* 0.100
(0.014) (0.015) (0.077) (0.061) (0.061)
Severe -0.042*** 0.003 0.012 0.031 0.035
(0.008) (0.008) (0.057) (0.057) (0.060)
Moderate -0.008 0.013** 0.126** 0.125** 0.111*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059)
Observations 21,551 19,224 21,551 19,224 2,391 1,119 1,061 2,391 1,119 1,061
R-squared 0.455 0.504 0.463 0.509 0.017 0.011 0.009 0.026 0.025 0.021
Controls No Yes No Yes
Polynomial order 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth 0.500 0.114 0.108 0.500 0.114 0.108
Procedure CTT IK CTT IK
AIC -1389.1 -1377.86
Note: fixed-effects model analyses in columns (1) - (4). The municipalities and years fixed effects included. Standard error clustered at
municipality level in parentheses. Controls variables are lagged two years before each election and include population, average income,
GINI coefficient, the share of graduated citizens, the share of voters below 18 years old, the proportion of workers in agriculture and
industry sector, palliative policy, and prevention policy. RDD analyses in columns (5) - (10). Forcing variable is the vote margin of
victory of the candidate for mayor in the president’s party in the previous municipal election. In columns (5) and (8) the bandwidth is
chosen arbitrarily and the polynomial order of forcing variable is chosen by AIC criteria. The columns (6) and (9) use bandwidth selector
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) (CTT ). The columns (7) and (10) use the bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) (IK ). Robust standard error in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.
I study the categories of drought, the analyses reach very similar conclusions. Columns (3)
and (4) show that extreme droughts have a positive average correlation of 10 to 12 percentage
points, severe droughts have a correlation of approximately 6 percentage points, and moderate
droughts have a negative correlation. Columns (8)-(12) show the heterogeneous local causal
effect of each category of drought. Although the extreme category yields unstable coefficients,




Dependent variable: vote share of mayor’s party
Fixed-effects model RDD for HLATE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Party alignment 0.081*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.097*** 0.143*** 0.153*** 0.157*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.129***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.019) (0.027) (0.031) (0.021) (0.030) (0.033)
Party alignment x Drought 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.124** 0.099 0.125
(0.021) (0.022) (0.053) (0.072) (0.080)
Drought -0.079*** -0.071*** 0.007 -0.017 -0.047
(0.015) (0.016) (0.038) (0.053) (0.059)
Categories of drought:
Party alignment x Extreme 0.126** 0.099* 0.084 -0.119 0.185
(0.056) (0.056) (0.196) (0.264) (0.324)
Party alignment x Severe 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.147*** 0.127* 0.154*
(0.022) (0.023) (0.057) (0.075) (0.083)
Party alignment x Moderate -0.045* -0.055** 0.089 0.177** 0.214**
(0.023) (0.025) (0.055) (0.076) (0.083)
Extreme -0.155*** -0.120*** 0.084 0.154 -0.148
(0.033) (0.034) (0.190) (0.261) (0.321)
Severe -0.090*** -0.078*** -0.003 -0.039 -0.063
(0.017) (0.018) (0.039) (0.054) (0.060)
Moderate -0.010 -0.004 -0.047 -0.087* -0.099*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.039) (0.051) (0.053)
Observations 21,888 19,466 21,888 19,466 1,864 1,191 973 1,864 1,191 973
R-squared 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.088 0.100 0.105 0.097 0.104 0.111
Controls No Yes No Yes
Polynomial order 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth 0.500 0.168 0.124 0.5 0.168 0.124
Procedure CTT IK CTT IK
AIC 160.0612 167.6262
Note: fixed-effects model analyses in columns (1) - (4). The municipalities and years fixed effects included. Standard error clustered at
municipality level in parentheses. Controls variables are lagged two years before each election and include population, average income, GINI
coefficient, the share of graduated citizens, the share of voters below 18 years old, the proportion of workers in agriculture and industry sector,
palliative policy, and prevention policy. RDD analyses in columns (5) - (10). forcing variable is the vote margin of victory of the candidate
for mayor in the president’s party in the previous municipal election. In columns (5) and (8) the bandwidth is chosen arbitrarily and the
polynomial order of forcing variable is chosen by AIC criteria. The columns (6) and (9) use bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico et al.
(2014) (CTT ). The columns (7) and (10) use the bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK ). Robust standard
error in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.
7 Concluding Remarks
In Brazil, drought is the most common natural disaster and is a major cause of hunger, thirst,
death, and forced migration. However, Nelson and Finan (2009) indicate that some people
living in regions that have historically been devastated by these events in fact prefer periods
of extreme water scarcity. In particular, they report that an elderly female goes so far as to
pray for a drought. The suggested reason for someone to have such a desire is that the poor
have become entirely dependent on government aid. As the arrival of the drought triggers the
government aid relief mechanism, locals come to wish for it.
The above paper departed from this long debate suggesting that the high incidence of
droughts in Brazil established the foundation for a long-run model of clientelism. For cen-
turies, the rural households have traded their servility with large landowners by means of
subsistence. In periods of severe water scarcity, people in extreme poverty face even higher
welfare deterioration. Landlords, in turn, afforded them supplies food and water, among other
necessities, but not without imposing rent extraction and patronage. This enforced social
interaction becomes known as the drought industry.
A force that could detach the historical ties of rural households with their patrons would
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be the insertion of a welfare-maximizing state, which would promote long-run investment in
infrastructure to improve natural disasters preparedness and assist the most deprived. Instead,
what is found is that the Brazilian government opportunistically captures the historical aid
dependency of peasants in order to maximize re-election chances.
The high political turnover due to drought creates a unique scenario that encourages the
central government to allocate aid relief strategically in order to assist politically aligned mu-
nicipalities to the detriment of those governed by opposition parties. On the one hand, sending
aid relief to aligned municipalities is a manner of forestalling the advance of opposition parties
and maintaining incumbent party alignment between municipal and central governments. On
the other hand, neglecting aid relief for non-aligned municipalities could guarantee municipal
political turnover and make room for candidates allies.
This paper finds evidence suggesting that voters anticipate the opportunistic behavior by
governments and therefore act strategically to maximize their future benefits. As political
alignment plays a significant role in public resource allocation, citizens foster this alignment
to increase their chances of being assisted in times of water crisis. Such voter behavior is
boosted when voters are experiencing a drought, which confirms that increased vulnerability
leads citizens to demand patronage politics in line with Bobonis et al. (2017). Politicians, for
their part, assimilate the demand of voters and strive to give them what they want. This
dynamic connects results in a long-run patronage equilibrium that leads to the sub-optimal
provision of public goods and prevents the development of a region.
In conclusion, the continued absence of investments in drought preparedness infrastruc-
ture combined with the lack of responsibility in the allocation of immediate relief verifies the
government’s low willingness to promote the general welfare. In fact, the intrinsic motivation
of landlords to take advantage of such degrading situations remains present in governmental
actions. Therefore, the old clientelism system between landlords and peasants described as the
drought industry did not vanish. Instead, this system was captured by the central government.
A relevant follow-up research agenda would be to examine how to break such a clientelism
cycle to ensure government efficiency in implementing welfare-enhancing public policies and in
promoting resilience against droughts.
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Appendix A Institutional Setting
Drought is one of the most common natural disasters in the world, and this phenomenon is the
most frequent disaster in Brazil and is both economically and environmentally destructive (Dai,
2011). In this scenario, the expression drought industry was invented from a singular observance
of the long-term socioeconomic consequences that this natural event triggers (Callado, 1960).
This catchphrase is regularly used in novels, song lyrics, and political debates (de Castro,
1967; Oliveira, 1977; Ribeiro, 1995; Silva, 2006; Matos, 2013) and refers to a complex process
of distortions in government transfers that initially aimed to alleviate the drought’s adverse
effects but are instead used for political purposes. Although the drought industry has never
been empirically tested, it is sustained by an informal rhetoric suggesting that the incidence of
droughts and the Brazilian political economy are directly linked. In the following subsections,
I first detail the background of the political anecdote, and I then describe the contemporary
situation.
A.1 The Origins of the Drought Industry
The roots of the drought industry in Brazil originate in the Portuguese colonial period (1500
− 1815). To populate the Brazilian territory and extract its productive value, the Portuguese
Crown granted vast areas of land to nobles, military officers, investors, and others loyal to
Lisbon. This practice resulted in land being distributed to just a few people who had some
prestige with the Crown. Because of this uneven distribution of land, large landholdings re-
mained, through time, in the hands of a small group of privileged citizens, who we will call the
elite.
Because the environment in drought-prone regions is characterized by very precarious con-
ditions, agricultural workers and their families lived permanently on the edge of survivability
(Guilhoto et al., 2011). In addition to facing extreme poverty and all social illnesses intrinsic
to this condition, during periods of severe water shortages, rural households are fated to fight
every day to find means to drink and to eat. Hunger and thirst reached their most drastic
levels and often led to death. Rural families become dependent on external aid to stay alive.
In exchange for protection during periods of thirst and starvation, landlords extended to
rural households a condition of servility, exploitation, and dependency. The characteristics of
such social contract, which has close ties with the uneven land ownership regime, are usually
associated with the “aristocratic mentality” that is characterized by values of obedience and
loyalty and have built a set of social relations marked by despotism and violence (Matos, 2013).
The panorama of elite citizens running their landholdings as fiefdoms persisted for centuries
throughout Brazilian history and underpinned a platform of unequal power of exchange between
landlords and peasants. Such an relationship with landlords providing the means of survival
and demanding loyalty in return become known as coronelismo.
A.2 The Contemporary Drought Industry
At the end of the nineteenth century, droughts began to receive public attention, and the
Brazilian central government began to promote aid relief policies to assist rural households
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suffering from this kind of natural disaster. Indeed, these governmental interventions reduced
drought-related mortality, attenuated migration movements, and reduced the vulnerability of
rain-fed farmers but did so at the expense of resilience to the weather perturbation. Families
living in drought-prone regions remained dependent on external aid to deal with a crisis be-
cause aid relief policies are rarely designed for drought preparedness measures. Instead, these
policies are mostly formulated in real time to attenuate the ongoing consequences of drought.
This approach to humanitarian aid programs led peasants to long-run adaptations to weather
shocks and has precluded these people from developing alternative adaptive mechanisms for
survival. Thus, in the absence of landlord protection, rural households continued to rely solely
on government actions for access to food, water, and necessary supplements during periods of
drought.
In this new context of governmental intervention, the role played by landlords in protection
for peasants did not vanish. Rather, quite the opposite occurred. Oligarchs captured the
agencies responsible for the aid relief programs, and the access to public resources from the
central government, in some way, was controlled by landlords (Silva, 2006). For instance,
the locations chosen for the construction of water reservoirs with public funds were on the
landlords’ properties so they could charge exorbitant prices for water access. In addition,
funding for public works was put directly into the hands of landlords, and thus, they had a
stronger influence over the hiring of rural workers, thus expanding their patriarchal authority.
In short, drought had become a large and prosperous business for this sui generis social class,
the industriais da seca (industrials of drought) (Callado, 1960).
Farmworkers in drought-prone regions, regardless of whether they had been servile to land-
lords, are dependent on the political apparatus of the government, and thus to the local elite,
during times of crisis. Since rural households face livelihood insecurity almost every year, there
are some anecdotes suggesting that beneficiaries, who are not sponsored by landlords, actually
prefer years of drought because government intervention brings a sense of security (Nelson and
Finan, 2009). In the period before public assistance is mobilized, communities commonly in-
vade local stores in search of food and block federal highways, stopping commercial food trucks
to plunder their contents. This activity indicates that citizens have become accustomed to
the dynamics between drought and governmental policies and have built expectations around
future actions by government agencies.
In some sense, the direct patronage role of landlords was replaced by government actions,
which is still an indirect patronage relationship between a political apparatus (landlords) and
voters (peasants). Mitigation policies for drought started to be a political commodity between
lower levels and higher levels of public administration. In order to guarantee the flow of public
revenues, a coalition between politicians at the municipality level and the federal level began
to be crucial. Municipalities where mayors were members of the opposition political party
of the central government suffer from delays in emergency funds or even the denial of funds
(Larreguy and Monteiro, 2014). Thus, the patronage system (coronelismo) also dominated the
relationships between levels of government itself (Nelson and Finan, 2009).
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Appendix B Robustness Checks of the Main Analysis
The main findings of the study are corroborated by two empirical strategies that are grounded
in different assumptions: a fixed-effects model and a regression discontinuity design. However,
there is still room to question potential flaws in the methodology. In order to address some
possible flaws, this section proposes robustness checks that complement the main findings.
Specifically, I reanalyze the two empirical strategies by 1) using a different technique for clus-
tering the standard errors, 2) restricting the sample to municipalities with a higher propensity
for drought, 3) decomposing droughts into cyclical and trend components, and 4) testing an
alternative measure of aridity shocks. I report the results for mayoral elections given that this is
the type of election where I find that voters rewarded political alignment and given that voters
do not care about party alignment in the presidential election. Table 8 shows the results.
One concern might be how the standard errors are grouped. Although the technical proce-
dure for clustering the standard errors does not affect the estimations, this procedure affects
the statistical significance. For instance, it may be that the variance of the incidence of drought
is correlated within municipalities that are geographically close to one another, that is, cities
located in the same Brazilian federal state. To consider this potential flaw in the analyses, I
cluster the standard errors at the state level instead of at the municipality level in Panel A. As
it can be seen in columns (1) to (5), how standard errors are clustered is not of concern since
the results maintain their statistical significance at the usual levels.
Given the extensive heterogeneity of Brazilian municipalities, one may be concerned about
which cities are driving the results. In the fixed-effects models, the estimates are provided by
the variation of droughts within the municipalities. However, some cities did not experience
any droughts during the analysis period, and therefore, these municipalities are not adding
information on the impact of droughts to the outcome variable apart from improving the
accuracy of the prediction of the control variables. In the same vein, municipalities that
have never experienced droughts may not be reasonable counterfactuals for the regression
discontinuity design approach. To ensure that the effects found are not due to the presence of
municipalities that have a very low likelihood of experiencing droughts, I restrict the sample
to cities that have experienced at least one drought. The results are depicted in Panel B. The
coefficient sizes remain similar to those in the primary analysis; however, for RDD, I probably
lose statistical power due to the drastic reduction in sample size in columns (8) to (10).
Additionally, I deal with two crucial issues that can be raised from the analyses. First,
an open question in the literature regarding the economic impacts of natural disasters is that
what matters most is not clear: the intensity of a shock or the change in the level of a shock
(Healy and Malhotra, 2013). It may be that voters living in a region that regularly experiences
extreme droughts act differently from voters residing in an area that rarely faces these kinds of
events and that between-municipality variation characteristics do not accurately capture these
behavioral differences. Second, since voters’ previous expectations are crucial in deciding who
to vote for, and because both the level and level change shocks may have different implications
for voter expectations, the electoral consequences may also be different. One way to address
both of the issues referred to above is to decompose the drought measure into the following
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Table 8: Robustness Checks
Panel A
Fixed-effects model RDD for HLATE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Party alignment 0.081*** 0.089*** 0.143*** 0.153*** 0.157***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.030) (0.035)
Party alignment x Drought 0.078** 0.075** 0.124** 0.099 0.125
(0.033) (0.036) (0.057) (0.112) (0.093)
Drought -0.079*** -0.071*** 0.007 -0.017 -0.047
(0.020) (0.023) (0.042) (0.073) (0.066)
Observations 21,888 19,466 1,864 1,191 973
R-squared 0.032 0.031 0.088 0.100 0.105
Panel B
Fixed-effects model RDD for HLATE
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Party alignment 0.043* 0.050** 0.185* 0.183* 0.132
(0.022) (0.024) (0.111) (0.095) (0.095)
Party alignment x Drought 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.071 0.071 0.122
(0.030) (0.032) (0.139) (0.118) (0.119)
Drought -0.072*** -0.066*** -0.091 -0.047 -0.099
(0.015) (0.016) (0.100) (0.090) (0.090)
Observations 5,631 5,198 446 260 252
R-squared 0.071 0.065 0.136 0.156 0.171
Panel C
Fixed-effects model RDD for HLATE
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Party alignment 0.074*** 0.083*** 0.101* 0.093** 0.085*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.056) (0.043) (0.049)
Party alignment x Cyclical component (AI) 0.070*** 0.056** 0.300** 0.219** 0.247**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.125) (0.096) (0.106)
Party alignment x Trend component (AI) 0.016** 0.014** 0.079** 0.066** 0.079**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.036) (0.028) (0.032)
Cyclical component (AI) -0.066*** -0.057*** -0.241*** -0.119** -0.169**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.071) (0.060) (0.068)
Trend component (AI) -0.019*** -0.015** -0.056*** -0.029* -0.051**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020)
Observations 21,888 19,466 1,864 1,191 973
R-squared 0.033 0.032 0.093 0.101 0.111
Panel D
Fixed-effects model RDD for HLATE
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Party alignment 0.090*** 0.098*** 0.181*** 0.157*** 0.166***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.032) (0.026) (0.029)
Party alignment x Zscore AI 0.009 0.010 0.086** 0.086*** 0.075**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.038) (0.029) (0.032)
Zscore AI -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.049** -0.046** -0.052***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020)
Observations 21,888 19,466 1,864 1,191 973
R-squared 0.033 0.032 0.086 0.098 0.103
Note: no controls included in columns (1), (6), (11), and (16). Controls included in columns (2),
(7), (12), and (17). In columns (3), (8), (13), and (18) the bandwidth are chosen arbitrarily and the
polynomial order of forcing variable are chosen by AIC criteria. Columns (4), (9), (14), and (19) use
bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) (CTT ). Columns (5), (10), (15), and (20) use
bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK ). Robust standard error in
parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.
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two components: the trend and the cycle. Municipalities that have A path dependence on
droughts would exhibit high values of the trend variable, ensuring control of the difference
in characteristics between drought-prone cities, and the cyclical component would capture an
unexpected change in the level of aridity. Since I have time series data on aridity from 1963
to 2013, I decompose the trend and cyclical components following the procedure suggested by
Hamilton (2017). This procedure calculates the trend and cycle components for each period as a
simple prediction of linear regression taking into account only past observations. This approach
is fundamental because a priori, voters have no information on future weather conditions and
base all their beliefs solely on the past. Note that the trend component smoothly tracks the
actual aridity index, while the cyclical component follows a random walk around zero and is
arguably exogenous. Panel C depicts the results. The cyclical component seems to be the
most determinant for the positive effect of drought and political alignment on the vote share
of mayor’s party. That is, both impacts on the level and level changes are important for voter
behavior. However, the change in level has a stronger consequence. This finding may be
because an unexpected change leads to a reordering of the beliefs of voters. That is to say,
voters alter their predictions of the trajectory of the level of aridity drastically, and thus, they
react more forcefully in their voting strategies.
Finally, to ensure meaningful comparisons across municipalities with different water scarcity
conditions, aridity shocks are measured as the Z-score of the aridity index. More specifically, I
calculate the difference between the current period’s aridity and the historical mean of aridity
in the municipality during the same two years divided by the municipality’s historical stan-
dard deviation. Such a measurement is regularly used in studies that analyze droughts only
taking into account precipitations (Rocha and Soares, 2015; Bobonis et al., 2017). The results
presented in Panel C are robust to this aridity shock measurement choice and confirm that the
party alignment effect increases when municipalities suffer a more significant water shortage
than their historical average.
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Appendix C RDD Validity
In this appendix, I graphically show the validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)
using covariates as dependent variables.
Figure 9: share of workers in agriculture sector
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure 10: share of graduated citizens
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
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Figure 11: extreme drought
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure 12: moderate drought
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure 13: severe drought
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
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Figure 14: GINI coefficient
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure 15: average income
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure 16: share of workers in industry sector
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
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Figure 17: population
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure 18: share of voters below $18$ years
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure 19: temperature
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
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Appendix D Data Sources





Share of graduated citizens Brazilain Census (1991, 2000, 2010) from IBGE www.ibge.gov.br
Share of workers in agriculture sector Brazilain Census (1991, 2000, 2010) from IBGE www.ibge.gov.br
Share of workers in industry sector Brazilain Census (1991, 2000, 2010) from IBGE www.ibge.gov.br
Average income Brazilain Census (1991, 2000, 2010) from IBGE www.ibge.gov.br
GINI coefficient Brazilain Census (1991, 2000, 2010) from IBGE www.ibge.gov.br
Population FINBRA www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br
Share of voters below 18 years old Tribunal Superior Eleitoral www.tse.jus.br
Margin of victory before presidential elections Tribunal Superior Eleitoral www.tse.jus.br
Margin of victory before mayoral elections Tribunal Superior Eleitoral www.tse.jus.br
Vote share of president’s party Tribunal Superior Eleitoral www.tse.jus.br
Vote share of mayor’s party Tribunal Superior Eleitoral www.tse.jus.br
Palliative policy S2ID s2id.integracao.gov.br
Prevention policy Portal da Tranpareˆncia www.portaldatransparencia.gov.br
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